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The historic links between public international law, international 
criminal law and international human rights are explained with a 
focus on the seminal law-making period that followed the Second 
World War. The inaugural lecture of William Schabas uses the ‘three 
charters’ as a theme to develop his argument. These are the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which, in 
the French language, is a component of the Charte internationale des 
droits de l’homme). The three instruments circumscribe a body of 
international law principles that are as relevant today as at the time 
they were first proclaimed, at a time when much of Europe still lay in 
ruins. One of the main themes is the right to peace, which manifests 
itself in the United Nations Charter as the prohibition of the resort 
to force, in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal as the 
criminalization of aggression, and in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as the protection of the right to life. Schabas explores 
some of the features of the formulation of these instruments, 
particularly the Universal Declaration. One notable aspect is the role 
that women played, something that had never before happened in the 
history of international law.
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The cataclysm through which we have just passed 
opens a new era in the history of civilization; it is of 
greater importance than all those that preceded it: 
more important than that of the Renaissance, than 
that of the French Revolution of 1789 or than that 
which followed the first World War; that is due to the 
profound changes which have taken place in every 
sphere of human activity, and above all in international 
affairs and in international law.
Judge Alejandro Alvarez, individual opinion in the 
Corfu Channel Case, 9/4/49
Over a span of about three years, in the aftermath of the defeat 
of Nazi Germany, international law underwent a revolutionary 
transformation, developing instruments that continue to 
define the lives of both nations and individuals. Three charters 
lie at the heart of this development: the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 
and what I must call - in French - the Charte internationale des 
droits de l’homme, because its English title is the International 
Bill of Rights. My thesis today is that these three documents 
are profoundly related, and that this relationship should 
contribute to a contemporary understanding of the association 
between human rights, justice and peace.
The Charter of the United Nations was adopted in San 
Francisco in late June 1945 and entered into force on 24 
October of that year following the deposit of instruments of 
ratification by the Soviet Union. Within days a Preparatory 
Commission was at work in London, organizing the first 
session of the General Assembly to be held in the British 
capital early the following year. The Charter of the United 
Nations provides the architecture for the international 
organization. But it also affirms a series of purposes and 
principles. Among the purposes of the organization listed 
in article 1 is promotion and encouragement of respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. One of the 
seven principles enumerated in article 2 should also retain our 
attention: that the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’, 
is prohibited.
The second of the three charters, the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, was adopted in London 
on 8 August 1945 and entered into force immediately with 
the signature of the four ‘great powers’ who had negotiated 
its terms. It too was institutional in nature, establishing the 
mechanism for the prosecution and punishment of what were 
labelled the ‘major war criminals of the European axis’. Today, 
we generally call this institution the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
although the Charter says the seat of the court is in Berlin. 
With minor adaptations, the London Charter provided the 
model for the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East, known as the Tokyo Tribunal, where the great 
Dutch jurist Bernard Röling served as a judge.
Like the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal is also normative in nature. 
In a sense echoing the prohibition of force in article 2 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, it defines and condemns the 
crime against peace: the planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy to such an 
end. Almost in parallel, reflecting the commitment to the 
promotion and encouragement of human rights in article 
1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Nuremberg 
Charter also sets out a definition of crimes against humanity. 
These are described as murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, as well as persecutions on political, racial 
or religious grounds. This is the language of modern human 
rights law.
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The third of the three charters is actually not a single 
document but rather an amalgam of at least four and perhaps 
six legal texts. In his speech at the closing session of the 
San Francisco Conference in June 1945, president Harry S. 
Truman pledged that the new organization would soon draft 
an ‘international bill of rights’. This was unfinished business. 
There had been much tension during the negotiation of the 
Charter of the United Nations between many smaller states, 
who had felt strongly that it should contain a codification of 
fundamental rights, and the major powers, who were nervous 
about the consequences this might have on their global 
interests and ambitions as well as the treatment of minorities 
within their own borders.
The ‘international bill of rights’ figured on the lists of 
priorities established by the United Nations Preparatory 
Commission when it began work later in the year.1 The 
initial session of the General Assembly rebuffed a proposal 
from Cuba to begin work immediately on the adoption of 
the bill of rights.2 Instead, the Assembly decided to assign 
responsibility to the Commission on Human Rights. Some 
months later, it convened as a so-called ‘nuclear commission’, 
under the chairmanship of Eleanor Roosevelt. There were 
competing visions of the nature of this ‘bill of rights’. The 
Commission opted to prepare three distinct documents, a 
declaration, a convention or covenant, and an instrument 
governing implementation. Work proceeded rapidly on the 
first of these texts, which was intended to be a succinct and 
inspiring manifesto. On 10 December 1948, the General 
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Begging your indulgence with my poetic licence, the Universal 
Declaration is my third charter. The other components of the 
bill of rights would not be agreed for nearly two more decades.
Two of the three charters - the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are joined 
in an institutional sense. Indeed, in 1948 it was contended by 
some, including René Cassin, that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights should be understood as a detailed codification 
of the human rights clauses contained in the Charter of the 
United Nations. That is one view of the legal significance of 
the Declaration, and it is a compelling one that retains its 
vigour. The third instrument, the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal, is somewhat distinct because it was adopted 
by the four so-called ‘great powers’ outside the framework 
of the United Nations. But the Charter they concluded was 
subsequently ratified by many other States, including The 
Netherlands. In the final judgment of the Tribunal, the bench 
pointed to this ratification by what it called ‘Governments 
of the United Nations’ as confirmation of the international 
legitimacy of the institution.3
The International Military Tribunal condemned the invasion 
of the Netherlands as a crime against peace.4 It devoted 
considerable attention to the barbaric occupation policy 
in The Netherlands, noting the murder of hostages, pillage 
of property, and the deportation of labourers to Germany 
where they were worked as slaves. The Reich Commissioner 
for the Netherlands, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, was one of the 
twenty-four who were indicted. He knowingly participated 
in the deportation of 120,000 Dutch Jews to Auschwitz, but 
told the Tribunal he thought that Jews were relatively well off 
there and would be relocated after the war. Convicting him of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Tribunal said it 
found his claim to be ‘impossible to believe’.5 Please permit me 
to pay tribute to the Canadian officer who formally arrested 
Seyss-Inquart after he had been taken into custody in the 
Netherlands in early May 1945. His name was Tom Fairley, and 
he was my uncle. Let me also remind everyone that on Sunday 
27 January we mark International Holocaust Remembrance 
Day, so designated by resolution of the United Nations General 
Assembly seven years ago.6
This new professorship at Leiden University is branded 
‘international criminal law and human rights’. Its legal 
antecedents are the three charters that I am discussing today. 
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Until little more than a decade or so ago, the mere idea of a 
chair that linked international criminal law and human rights 
might have seemed far-fetched. Human rights as a significant 
focus for legal scholarship has been alive since the 1980s, 
perhaps even slightly before. International criminal law as 
a separate discipline may have still earlier origins, although 
what is generally meant is the cluster of issues that we tend 
today to call transnational criminal law. It is above all the idea 
of combining these two areas of academic research that is so 
innovative. Yet their roots are intertwined. Both germinated 
in the seminal law-making period of the post-Second World 
War period as the international order in which we now live was 
being constructed.
The relationship between international criminal law and 
human rights is not without some tension. Traditionally, 
human rights law tended to regard criminal justice with a 
degree of suspicion. Criminal justice was often viewed as a 
source of violations of human rights rather than as a means 
to implement and enforce human rights. In this paradigm, 
the ‘victims’ of human rights abuses were persons accused 
before the courts, or those detained in prison. Only fairly 
recently, and somewhat gradually, has human rights embraced 
criminal justice. International courts and tribunals like the 
European Court of Human Rights speak of the ‘procedural 
obligation’ associated with protection of the right to life 
and the prohibition of torture. International human rights 
NGOs campaign to strengthen international criminal justice 
institution as well as to insist that national courts assume their 
obligations.
Similarly, international criminal justice had its own problems 
about embracing human rights. Only the briefest references to 
human rights appear in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: as a subsidiary authority for interpretation, 
as a qualification for certain judges, and in the formulation of 
the exclusionary rule for evidence. In 1998, when the Statute 
was being drafted, many diplomats wanted to distance the 
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International Criminal Court from any close association 
with human rights, terrified that it might discourage support 
in some quarters. If there was any doubt about the deep 
relationship between the two bodies, the judges of the 
International Criminal Court have certainly rectified the 
situation.
When we return to the 1940s, it becomes clear enough that 
international criminal justice and human rights share the 
same DNA. The principles were first expressed in a somewhat 
inchoate form by Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his famous Four 
Freedoms speech of January 1941. The first two, freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion, had already been entrenched 
in many national constitutions. The third was freedom from 
want, ‘which, translated into world terms, means economic 
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy 
peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world’. 
The fourth, said Roosevelt, was ‘freedom from fear - which, 
translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of 
armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that 
no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical 
aggression against any neighbour’.
The promise of a new world order where traditional 
sovereignty was subject to international norms of general 
application directed at the protection of individuals in 
peacetime as well as during war began to emerge. This took the 
form of proposals to include human rights language within the 
constitution of the new international organization, the United 
Nations. But when delegates to the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission in 1944 argued that Nazi atrocities perpetrated 
against German nationals should be addressed, powerful 
governments, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, resisted the idea. It was a matter beyond the reach of 
international law, they told the Commission. As more news of 
the nature and scale of Nazi crimes emerged, such a position 
became increasingly untenable, and they ultimately adjusted 
their position and accepted a breach of sovereign prerogatives. 
The result can be seen in article VI(c) of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, where a definition of crimes 
against humanity is set out. It was in some sense weak and 
conditional, rather like the fragile references to human rights 
in the Charter of the United Nations, and the restrained vision 
was sustained in the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal as well as in the subsequent proceedings in the 
Nuremberg courthouse.
The next stage in this development was adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 
1948. Let me explain my focus on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. My most recent major research project has 
been a review of the drafting history of the Declaration. All 
of the relevant documents within the United Nations system 
have been assembled. These materials - more than 3,000 
pages in total - will be published by Cambridge University 
Press next month.7 The collection begins with the work of 
the Nuclear Commission on Human Rights. It studied the 
mandate it had inherited from the San Francisco Conference, 
via the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council. The form the bill of rights would take was uncertain. 
By 1947, the Commission was moving forward on three 
separate instruments, a manifesto, a convention and a text 
on implementation. Within a year, the first document - then 
designated the International Declaration of Human Rights 
- was ready for debate within the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly. There, it took its final form and, upon the 
suggestion of the eminent French jurist René Cassin, the name 
was changed to Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
There were only 58 members of the United Nations in 1948, 
and several of them did not participate very actively in the 
negotiation of the Declaration. Canada, where I first practised 
law and began my academic career, was one of the bystanders, 
hoping that the whole matter would be postponed and, to 
the astonishment of its allies, abstaining in the penultimate 
vote on the full draft Declaration in the Third Committee of 
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the General Assembly.8 Ireland, where I held a professorship 
in human rights law for more than a decade, was absent 
altogether, excluded from membership in the United Nations 
by the Soviet veto until 1955. The Netherlands played 
what can fairly be described as a modest role. At times it 
made significant contributions to the process, including 
the preparation of a detailed analysis of an early draft that 
contained several suggestions for amendment. Referring to 
draft article 1, which was based on the French Déclaration 
des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, beginning with the words 
‘all men are born free and equal in dignity and in rights’, the 
delegation of The Netherlands said: ‘It seems superfluous to 
state explicitly that the word “men” implies both men and 
women’.9 The delegation was uncomfortable about a reference 
to asylum questioning whether the issue even belonged within 
the Declaration.10 When it came to equal rights of both spouses 
in marriage, the Netherlands wanted it to be understood that 
this would not exclude a requirement that married women 
require the authorization of their husbands to appear in 
court.11 In the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the 
Netherlands proposed that the Declaration contain a reference 
to ‘man’s divine origin and immortal destiny’; its amendment 
was not taken up.12 Probably its most significant contribution 
was a proposal recognizing parental rights in the choice of 
education.13 A text along similar lines submitted by Lebanon 
was voted on first, and now constitutes article 26(3) of the 
Declaration.
Within the United Nations, the process of drafting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided a forum for 
the participation of non-governmental organizations. Their 
role had been officially recognized in the Charter of the United 
Nations. At the present day, such debate would be dominated 
by the major international human rights organizations, such 
as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the 
Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme. But Amnesty 
and the Watch did not exist at the time, and the Fédération 
was nowhere to be seen. In the late 1940s, the prominent 
NGOs that engaged in the drafting process were religious in 
nature, principally Jewish and Catholic, or major trade union 
bodies. The Jewish and Catholic organisations soon lost their 
prominence; perhaps this is related to the admission of Israel 
as a Member State in 1949 and of the Holy See with observer 
status in the General Assembly in 1964. The trade union 
organizations also seem to have been much more robust and 
dynamic then than they are today.
But of the participants in the crafting of the Declaration, 
no constituency is more striking than that of women. Never 
before had women been so engaged in international law 
making in any meaningful way. Apparently there were some 
feminist organizations working the corridors at the Paris 
Peace Conference, in 1919, and four women were among 
the hundreds who signed the Charter of the United Nations 
at the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference in 1945. 
The Commission on Human Rights was the first important 
international body to have a woman - Eleanor Roosevelt - 
as its chair. She provided phenomenal and indeed decisive 
leadership, but she was certainly not alone. Several other 
dynamic women contributed in significant ways as members 
of the Commission on Human Rights - such as Hansa Mehta 
of India - or the companion Commission on the Status of 
Women - Bodil Betrup of Denmark, Hélène Lefaucheux of 
France, Jessie Street of Australia, Amalia Castillo Ledón of 
Mexico - and the General Assembly - Minerva Bernardino of 
the Dominican Republic.
They were concerned with several issues, including the 
terminology to be used. Eleanor Roosevelt was herself 
indifferent to the references to ‘the rights of man’, but her 
feminist colleagues were deeply concerned about sexist 
language in the Declaration. As a result of their efforts, article 
1 of the Declaration begins with the words ‘all human beings’ 
instead of ‘all men’, which had been in the early draft. They 
insisted upon an explicit recognition of the principle of equal 
pay for equal work. They also obtained a modification to the 
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provision concerning the family so as to recognize the equal 
rights of women and men not only during marriage but 
also ‘at its dissolution’, a notion that some delegations found 
unacceptable because they were unwilling even to acknowledge 
divorce. Finally, they resisted incorporation of any language 
in the Declaration that might be implied as indicating a 
prohibition on abortion.
There were many references to the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials during the drafting of the Universal Declaration. At the 
time there was a widely-shared understanding of the close 
connection between human rights and international criminal 
justice. In one of the sessions of the Nuclear Commission 
on Human Rights, in May 1946, René Cassin stressed the 
importance of the international trials, explaining that ‘the 
United Nations have created a precedent for putting on trial 
those who violate the rights of man’.14 Following his suggestion, 
the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretariat of 
the Commission on Human Rights to prepare a special study 
on information on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that was of 
importance to the field of human rights.15
Attention necessarily focussed on the draft provision 
concerning the prohibition of retroactive criminal prosecution. 
The Belgian delegation proposed the following amendment: 
‘This provision shall not, however, preclude the trial and 
conviction of persons who have committed acts which, at 
the time of their commission, were regarded as criminal by 
virtue of the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’.16 Explaining the amendment, Fernand Dehousse 
said its purpose was ‘to prevent the possibility of German 
historians, discussing the responsibility for the war, using the 
wording of the original text to try and prove the illegality of 
the War Crimes Trials, especially at Nuremberg’.17 The idea 
was retained in article 11(2) of the Declaration and developed 
in more elaborate provisions in article 15 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Recently, the 
European Court of Human Rights dismissed a challenge to 
a conviction for war crimes perpetrated in 1944, in Latvia, 
relying upon the text of the European Convention that is 
derived from the Universal Declaration.18
When international human rights law is taught to university 
students, it is rather routine for the lecturer to insist upon 
the distinction between the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the treaties that were subsequently adopted by 
noting that the former is ‘not binding’ whereas the latter 
are ‘binding’. This is not a helpful formulation. It is far too 
dismissive of the significance of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in the modern legal framework. Stating 
that the Universal Declaration is ‘not binding’ dramatically 
underestimates its legal significance, just as claiming that the 
treaties are ‘binding’ probably overstates their impact in most 
circumstances. The enforcement mechanisms of the treaties 
are quite intentionally rather weak, consisting of a fairly 
polite monitoring of reports by States and the adjudication of 
individual petitions that sometimes but by no means reliably 
delivers effective remedies to victims. The treaties also suffer 
from a very detailed wording that in some respects has become 
somewhat anachronistic. By comparison, the language of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has retained its 
freshness. Moreover, the Declaration’s major shortcoming, 
which is its lack of a monitoring or enforcement mechanism, 
was largely rectified recently when the United Nations Human 
Rights Council affirmed that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights would provide one of the normative bases for 
the Universal Periodic Review.19
In practice, when States report to the Human Rights Council 
they do not invoke the limits that are defined by their treaty 
obligations, including reservations and derogation. Rather, 
they behave as if there is a body of general human rights law 
common to all Member States of the United Nations. For 
example, when China reported to the Human Rights Council 
in 2009, it might have refused to speak to the issue of capital 
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punishment, given that it has yet to ratify the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and as a result has not 
accepted any treaty obligations on the matter. But instead, it 
addressed the issue of the death penalty in its report, at its own 
initiative and without objection.20 Similarly, the United States 
might have quarreled about the need to report on economic 
and social rights, as it has not ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In fact, the 
report of the United States focused on health care, housing and 
education.21 The legal foundation, in both cases, can only have 
been the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
A pedant might object that whereas the presentation of reports 
under the human rights conventions is a legal obligation, this 
is not the case for the Universal Periodic Review, where the 
requirement is set out in a resolution of the Human Rights 
Council. But over the years 2008 to 2011, every Member State 
of the United Nations complied with the ‘non-binding’ terms 
of the Human Rights Council resolution and participated in 
the Universal Periodic Review process. This is more than can 
be said for the reporting obligations imposed by the treaties, 
which are frequently ignored, without apparent consequence 
other than some rather ephemeral and obscure public shame. 
The voluntary reporting to the Human Rights Council on 
compliance with the ‘non-binding’ standard of the Declaration 
looks in some ways to be more robust and effective than the 
so-called binding obligations imposed by human rights treaties
The debate about ‘binding’ and ‘non-binding’ also highlights 
the fact that the conventions and covenants are directed to 
States and to States alone. They can only be ‘binding’ upon 
those who ratify them. The Universal Declaration, on the other 
hand, has a much broader audience. It is addressed not only 
to States but also to individuals, to organizations, to entities 
and to corporations. As the preamble affirms, it is ‘a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ that 
speaks to ‘every individual and every organ of society’. There 
is a useful although admittedly isolated reference in a Security 
Council resolution that highlights this point. In 1972, the 
Council referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a legal standard to be respected in the area of labour rights 
in Southwest Africa.22 Acting pursuant to the Resolution, the 
United States reported to the Secretary-General that it had 
notified some forty American corporations with activities 
in Namibia, requesting that they observe the Universal 
Declaration in their activities.23 Individuals and corporations 
may not be ‘bound’ by the Universal Declaration in the sense 
of treaties, but they - we - are obliged to employ it as a guide to 
our lives and our activities.
 
A few weeks ago, I attended a conference in The Hague on 
the relationship between international human rights law 
and the law of armed conflict. There was a debate about 
the extraterritorial application of human rights law. Some 
conservative governments and their supporters in the academic 
community seek to exclude the human rights treaties when 
armed forces operate outside the country’s borders. This is a 
matter that has vexed the human rights treaty-based bodies, 
including the United Nations Human Rights Committee, as 
well as the European Court of Human Rights. The discussion 
is about deconstructing and interpreting jurisdictional clauses 
in the treaties. Once we shift the debate to the broad human 
rights provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the conversation changes. The broad human rights 
obligations that result from the Declaration apply to the 
conduct of a State regardless of whether the matter falls within 
the precise terms of a treaty like the International Covenant.
Take, for example, the murder of Osama Bin Laden last year 
by American special forces in Pakistan. Reasonable people 
may disagree about whether the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights can be applied, based upon a 
rigorous construction of article 2(1), but the same difficulty 
does not arise with respect to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Under the Declaration, the United States was 
required to respect Bin Laden’s right to life, bearing in mind 
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the circumstances of course; what appears to have been his 
gratuitous and unnecessary murder was a violation of the right 
to life even if it is not a breach of the International Covenant, 
because of its jurisdictional limitations. After Bin Laden 
had been killed, the right to dignity in the disposition of his 
body remained, as well as the right of his family to know the 
truth, for much the same reason that the United States-based 
corporations active in Namibia were required to respect the 
human rights set out in the Universal Declaration.
 
Let me return to the three Charters, and conclude by 
considering one of the golden threads that run through each 
of them and that indeed binds them together. This is the 
importance of peace. In the case of the Charter of the United 
Nations, this should hardly need any demonstration, given the 
prohibition on the use of force found in article 2(4), not to 
mention many other relevant references in the text. Similarly, 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal criminalizes 
the resort to aggressive war in article 6(1), where this is 
labeled ‘crimes against peace’. Today, we speak of the crime 
of aggression, a concept whose place is increasingly validated 
within the body of international criminal law.
In the third charter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the importance of peace is perhaps more obscure, 
or possible simply implicit. This may have contributed to a 
degree of indifference in some sectors of the human rights 
community to the codification of the crime of aggression in 
the Rome Statute. The initial draft preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights began with the words ‘there can 
be no peace unless human rights and freedoms are respected’ 
and concluded with the words ‘there can be no human dignity 
unless war and the threat of war is abolished ‘.24 If the final text 
is not as explicit, that does not mean the idea was abandoned. 
For confirmation, we need go no further than the reference to 
the Four Freedoms in the second paragraph of the preamble of 
the Universal Declaration: ‘Whereas disregard and contempt 
for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and 
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed 
as the highest aspiration of the common people,…’ Franklin 
D. Roosevelt said the fourth freedom meant that ‘no nation 
will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression 
against any neighbour’. This view of the Universal Declaration 
is enhanced when its content is construed within the context of 
the adoption of the Three Charters.
 
With their close rapprochement in time, the Three Charters 
must be understood in a holistic way rather than in 
isolation, as separate and distinct texts. There may be many 
manifestations of such a vision. The emerging doctrine of 
the responsibility to protect, codified by the United Nations 
General Assembly on the sixtieth anniversary of the adoption 
of the Charter of the United Nations, draws strongly upon 
the other two Charters, using the language of international 
criminal law. As for human rights law, perhaps its imperatives 
help temper those enthusiasts of the responsibility to protect 
with militarist inclinations. The crime of aggression, whose 
place in the law of the International Criminal Court is 
increasingly secured, develops the prohibition of the resort 
to force in the Charter of the United Nations, but also the 
importance of peace for the implementation of the norms 
and standards set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.
Vote of Thanks
Let me now pass to the final part of my lecture, which is the 
cherished tradition of a few words of thanks to people who 
have been important for me.
First of all I would like to pay special tribute to everyone at 
Leiden University who has made this new chair possible, 
especially those who have been responsible for my 
appointment. But may I first acknowledge my immense 
gratitude to two of the University’s great professors emeriti, 
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Frits Kaltshoven and John Dugard, both of whom have 
honoured me by their presence here today. I must also 
thank the Board of the University, presided by our Rector 
Magnificus, the dean of the Faculty of Law, prof. Rick Lawson, 
the members of the Grotius Centre for International Legal 
Studies, especially prof. Nico Schrijver, prof. Larissa van den 
Herik, prof. Carsten Stahn and prof. Joe Powderly, and the 
Head of the Department of Criminal Law, prof. Tineke Cleiren. 
Without their warm welcome, their gratitude and support, this 
chair and today would not be possible.
I would like to thank especially Penelope Soteriou, who has 
shared her life with me for nearly forty years. She is also the 
mother of my two wonderful daughters, Marguerite and 
Louisa, and the grandmother of my four - soon to be five - 
marvelous grandsons, Thomas, George, Ezra and Peter.
And finally, I would like to say a word to my students, past 
and present, whose attendance today is greatly appreciated. 
I have been teaching long enough now to see students of 
mine develop impressive careers, as university lecturers, 
professionals in intergovernmental organizations, lawyers and 
activists - some of them are here with us today. The younger 
ones may look to them as role models. My colleagues here 
understand what I mean when I say how immensely fulfilling 
an academic career can be. And the best part of it is the 
engagement with students at the outset of their own careers 
and the opportunity to help them on their way.
Ik heb gezegd.
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The historic links between public international law, international 
criminal law and international human rights are explained with a 
focus on the seminal law-making period that followed the Second 
World War. The inaugural lecture of William Schabas uses the ‘three 
charters’ as a theme to develop his argument. These are the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which, in 
the French language, is a component of the Charte internationale des 
droits de l’homme). The three instruments circumscribe a body of 
international law principles that are as relevant today as at the time 
they were first proclaimed, at a time when much of Europe still lay in 
ruins. One of the main themes is the right to peace, which manifests 
itself in the United Nations Charter as the prohibition of the resort 
to force, in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal as the 
criminalization of aggression, and in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as the protection of the right to life. Schabas explores 
some of the features of the formulation of these instruments, 
particularly the Universal Declaration. One notable aspect is the role 
that women played, something that had never before happened in the 
history of international law.
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